

imbellis iuventae / poplitibus timidove tergo” (vss. 15–16).

The repeated mention of *virtus* by Horace further strengthens the verbal and ideological parallel with Tyrtaeus. Compare lines 17–24 of the Horatian Ode with the following extract from Tyrtaeus (9. 13–15 D.): ἦδ’ ἀρετή, τόδ’ ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον / κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίγνεται ἀνδρὶ νέωι / ξυνὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόλῃ τε παντί τε δήμῳ. The prize (ἄεθλον) of the Greek games is transmuted by Horace into the prize of office (*honoribus*); but Horace rejects this prize in favor of other *honores* which are *intaminati*. Tyrtaeus’ man of virtue serves his country well by his prowess in war. Horace also expects his man of virtue to serve his country in any capacity, civil or military, but warns him of the risks of a *repulsa sordida* in the elections, where he would be dependent on the whim of a fickle populace (*arbitrio popularis auras*).

Finally, compare “*virtus recludens immeritis mori / caelum*” (vss. 21–22) with Tyrtaeus 9. 31–32 D., οὐδέ ποτε κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἀπόλλυται

οὐδ’ ὄνομ’ αὐτοῦ / ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ γῆς περ ἐὼν γίγνεται ἀθάνατος. The idea of immortal glory is equally emphasized by both poets; the difference is in the imagery and the manner of expression. Horace uses the thoroughly Roman idea of deification as a reward for virtue. In another Ode of the same cycle, he hints at divine honors for Augustus⁹ and elsewhere pictures the deified emperor drinking nectar *purpureo ore*. Tyrtaeus, more practical (ὑπὸ γῆς) and certainly less superstitious, is content to promise undying glory to those who die on behalf of fatherland and children (9. 34 D.). The idea of immortal glory which separates the *meriti* from the crowd (“*coetus vulgaris et udam / spernit humum fugiente penna*” [vss. 23–24]) is the Horatian counterpart of the fame which Tyrtaeus bestows on those who honorably survive a victorious battle:

γῆράσκων ἀστοῖσι μεταπρέπει, οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν
βλάπτειν οὐτ’ αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης ἐθέλει,
πάντες δ’ ἐν θάκοισιν ὁμῶς νέοι οἱ τε κατ’ αὐτὸν
εἴκουσ’ ἐκ χώρης οἱ τε παλαιότεροι [9. 39–42 D.].

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9. *Odes* 3. 5. 2–3, 3. 3. 12.

PLAUTUS *RUDENS* 902

In digitis hodie percoquam quod ceperit. “‘I’ll fry on my fingers,’ i.e. he will catch nothing,” wrote E. A. Sonnenschein, taking the difficulty in his stride. More realistically F. Marx said, “Noch nicht erklärt.” I believe this is a case for the prescription of F. Skutsch: “Es ist ja bekannt genug, dass man bei Plautus gelegentlich zurück übersetzen muss, um Witz, ja um Sinn in eine Stelle hinein-zubekommen” (*RhM*, LV [1900], 278, n. 2; cf. F. Leo, *Plaut. Forsch.*², pp. 104 ff. and 124 f.; and P. Legrand, *Daos*, pp. 601 ff.).

If, as a rendering of the original Greek, the expression *in digitis percoquam* was one of those “*maculae, quas aut incuria fudit / aut humana parum cavit natura*,” Plautus will have been in no different case from another voluminous writer, Livy (see P. G. Walsh, *G and R*, N.S. V, XXVII [1958], 83 ff., on

“Livy’s Howlers”). We should perhaps remember, too, the difficult script of the third century B.C. (W. Schubart, *Papyruskunde*, pp. 24 f.), since, in the domain of paleography, even able modern scholars have not been immune from error (R. Merkelbach and H. van Thiel, *Gr. Lesehefte*, p. vi). But Plautus may have had a defective text (cf. L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars* [Oxford, 1968], pp. 4 f.).

The meaning is surely that the fish will be *ἐναρίθμητοι*, capable of being counted *ἐπὶ δακτύλων*, rather than, as with large numbers, by the hands: see Friedländer on Juvenal 10. 249, [*Nestor*] *dextra computat annos*, and cf. Marquardt-Mau, *Privatleben*, page 98. As with ourselves, “the fingers of one hand” seems to have been proverbial for a small number: Lysias *apud* Athenaeus 612, *γραῖς*

ἧς ῥᾶον τοὺς ὀδόντας ἀριθμῆσαι ἢ τῆς χειρὸς τοὺς δακτύλους.

Considerations of both intrinsic and transcriptional probability suggest that P.'s source may have been copied by someone who mistook δὲ ψηφιῶ for δ' ἐψήσω (a word used of the cooking of fish by Philemon, Frag. 41 K). The form of a third-century ϕ could resemble a sigma followed by, and hardly if at all connected with, the vertical, i.e., C| (see M. Thompson, *Gr. and Lat. Pal.* [London, 1912], p. 191, ϕ, third from the end; V. Gardthausen, *Gr. Pal.*², Taf. 1, ϕ, 5th column). This, together with a tendency for the end of a line, such as δὲ ψηφιῶ might have formed in an iambic trimeter, to be cramped (M. Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 46), and the liability of an iota to be joined to the next letter (Schubart, *op. cit.*, p. 25), might, especially in view of the "clipping" of omega with the second "bow" not completed (Thompson, p. 190), have led to an understandable confusion: ΔΕΨΗCΩ for ΔΕΨΗC|Ω.¹ The mechanical ancient copying "by men who simply transcribed the words

which they seemed to see before them, without thinking of the sense," could lead to the kind of crass errors indicated by Jebb (*L. Whibley, Companion to Greek Studies*⁴, pp. 720 f.); cf. B. Metzger, *Text of the New Testament*, pages 191–95.

Even in our far more favorable modern conditions, so intelligent and literary a person as Thurber could be misled by the authority of the written word into repeating a not very meaningful expression. He once referred to the newspaper obituary of a college dean which said that the university in question was "the length and shadow" of Dean X, a phrase Thurber liked enough both to adopt himself, and to make the title of his essay. Yet who can doubt that what the composer of the obituary dictated to a secretary was a veiled quotation from Emerson, who said in his *Essay on Self-Reliance* that "an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man"?

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1. The disappearance of the iota through incorporation in omega might have increased the temptation to take the vertical of phi as itself an iota following sigma. As this combination,

however, would not give a real verb, the new iota might have been dropped to give the future of a verb of cooking with obvious superficial associations with fish.

SYMPOSIUM 211A AND PARMENIDES FRAG. 8

The terms in which Plato describes the Form of Beauty in the *Symposium* (211A ff.) are strikingly similar to those in which Parmenides describes Being in the *Way of Truth* (Frag. 8 D.–K. *passim*). Beauty is αἰὲ ὄν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον (cf. 8, 3 ἀγένητον ἔόν καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, 8, 13–14 οὔτε γενέσθαι οὔτ' ὀλλυσθαι, and 8, 19 πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτ' ἀπόλοιτο ἔόν; πῶς δ' ἂν κε γένοιτο;). It is οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον (cf. 8, 7 πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν;). It is οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν either in time, respect, or place (cf. 8, 23–24 οὐδέ τι τῇ

μᾶλλον . . . οὐδέ τι χειρότερον). And there are other points of resemblance.¹

It is probably true to say that any and all of the Platonic Forms are primarily versions of Parmenides' Being.² Perhaps the combination of an ascent, a revelation, and a philosophical instructress (the mysterious Diotima) caused Plato to wax particularly Parmenidean in this passage.³

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1. Perhaps Plato's use of μονοειδές at B1 and E4 is a point in favor of μονογενές at 8, 4.

2. Cf. *Phaedo* 78C ff., *Phaedrus* 247C ff., *Cratylus* 386D, 439C ff., *Philebus* 15B, *Timaeus* 52A.

3. This is not meant to imply, as some would have it, that

in Plato's eyes, Parmenides could do no wrong. Plato spent much time in counteracting the effects of the *Way of Truth*, both in reinstating Becoming and in combating Eleatic eristic.